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Introduction
Since the late 1990s, and most notably since the first decade of the 21st century, "social capital"
has been garnering increased attention. One reason for that may lie in the appeal generating
from the concept's ambiguity, so to speak. In fact, the wide range that is covered by social capital,
as well as doubts about its measurability, have been brought up time and time again. As if in
response to this, social capital has been classified into different types and it has been discussed
whether or not such classification has social effects, which has helped to clarify the concept.
The different types include: formal/informal, high-density/low-density, inward-looking/
outward-looking, horizontal/vertical, bridging/bonding, and structural/cognitive.
From a different perspective than this differentiation into contrasting types of social capital
and the analysis thereof, it has gradually become clear that the differences in approaches to
social capital have led to major differences in things like how the concept itself is defined and
the analysis of its social effects and influence. More specifically, one example of that is the
contrast between the individual-good and collective-good approaches. These differences in
approach likely bring about major differences in the overall view of society or in the value
assigned to social capital.
In the case of the individual-good approach, the issue is how much utility social capital
provides for the individual. Meanwhile, in the case of the collective-good approach, the issue is
how much influence social capital has on the social structure of a certain society. However, even
in these instances, the utility standpoint is not excluded. That is because the diversely valued
utility for society becomes an issue. 
Accordingly, we can probably describe the difference between the two approaches by
saying that the individual-good approach takes social capital as a prerequisite and looks at what
the relationship of individuals is to it, while a collective-good approach looks at what that social
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capital itself is like and, by extension, examines the social institutions. This paper will compare
both points of view, as well as to seek out what social capital itself should be like and the logic
behind the formation of "trust," a crucial element in social capital.
1.  Individual-good approach to social capital
On December 19, 2009, the Senshu University Center for Social Capital Studies (part of the
Institute for the Development of Social Intelligence) welcomed Professor Nan Lin of Duke
University (US), the leading expert in social capital research, for a discussion on the concept of
social capital. In the year prior to that, Lin's work about social capital, "Social Capital, Theory
of Social Structure and Action" (Lin 2001), was translated into Japanese. At his lecture, Lin
defined social capital, in accordance with his writing, as "resources embedded in a social
structure which are accessed and/or mobilized in purposive actions" (Lin 2001a, p. 29; Japanese
translation (hereafter, JP) p. 38), and he provided an explanation.
As for the salient features of Nan Lin's approach, one of the translators of that writing,
Mitsunori Ishida, points out the following, especially by way of comparison with Putnam.
Specifically, "Whether dealing with a person or a group, he focuses on the existence of some
individual and his relationship between the social relations and networks around him and
examines the benefits the latter bestows on the former" (Ishida 2008, p. 319). Dubbing this
approach an "individual-good approach," Ishida positions it opposite Putnam's method, which
he dubs a "collective-good approach," and he characterizes that method as follows: "It perceives
social capital as a good that is shared by members who belong to a certain group, area, or country.
These studies take the viewpoint that the networks, norms, and trust formed inside a group
contribute to the increase of healthy growth and group efficiency" (ibid., p. 320).
Actually, Lin himself differentiated between the two approaches and made his own
position clear. With regard to the collective-good approach in particular, he says, "The difficulty
arises when social capital is discussed as a collective or even a public good, along with trust,
norms, and other 'collective' or public goods. What has resulted in the literature is that the terms
have become alternative or substitutable terms or measurements. Divorced from its roots in
individual interactions and networking, social capital becomes merely another trendy term to
employ or deploy in the broad context of improving or building social integration and solidarity.
In the following, I will argue that social capital, as a relational asset, must be distinguished from
collective assets and goods such as culture, norms, and so on" (Lin 2001a, p. 26; JP p. 34).
Elinor Ostrom expresses these differentiated approaches as "a minimalist view and an
expansionist view." According to her (and Toh-Kyeong Ahn), "Common across the minimalist
views is an understanding of social capital as (1) belonging to individuals and as a (2) connection
to potential helpers as the primary form. Over time, the concept has been expanded — ‘stretched’
as some critics call it, especially of Putnam’s usage to include a variety of other factors and to
explain political and economic performances at group, regional, and national levels. An example
is Fukuyama’s (2000: 4) definition of social capital as ‘an instantiated informal norm that
promotes cooperation between two or more individuals.’ Coleman, although he is cited as being
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against Putnam’s ‘stretching,’ has actually provided a theoretical foundation for the expansion."1
(Ostrom & Ahn 2003, p. 40). This sentence is found in the context of her telling the theoretical
history of social capital research, and Ostrom perceives the method of Ronald Burt and Pierre
Bourdieu, for example, as a "minimalist view – [an approach toward] social capital as individual
connections" – and regards Ostrom's own community level approach and the national level
approach headed up by Putnam as an "expansionist view – relating social capital to collective
action and public policy." And she says James Coleman falls in the middle of the two views and
plays the role of mediating between the two.
While Ostrom's differentiation is understood as the progression of her research viewpoint
from a minimalist view to an expansionist view, minimalism has not disappeared from the debate
stage. Thus her expansionist view can be understood as a collective-good approach in the context
of the contrasting relationship between two present approaches. In fact, others have recognized
this as well. For example, according to the editors of "Social Capital, Reaching Out, Reaching
In" by Viva Ona Bartkus and James H. Davis, "Ostrom argues for a more expansive view of
social capital that emphasizes the importance of not only networks, but also the institutions or
norms that they foster" (Bartkus & Davis 2009, p. 6). This is precisely the approach that Nan
Lin tries to avoid. Meanwhile, this book itself is not consistent with regard to the differences in
approaches being discussed here. Its authors include not only Elinor Ostrom but also Daniel J.
Brass, discussed below, who is close to Nan Lin in terms of method. 
In this book, there are some who understand, like Daniel J. Brass, that even for Nan Lin,
it is not necessarily that the individual-good approach and the collective-good approach are
differentiated, but rather that in social capital research both viewpoints are used in a mixed,
complex fashion. He says that "The group-level definitions of social capital, which focus on
norms, can present an 'oversocialized' view of human behavior that leaves little room for
strategic [= based on self-interest] action. Equally unlikely is the 'undersocialized' view that
individuals act in isolation, disregarding the impact of social structure. Rather, I adopt a more
multilevel definition that allows for strategic action without disregarding social structure.
Incorporating both levels of analysis is essential because, as Lin points out: 'Whether social
capital is seen from the societal-group level or the relational (individual) level [in this case, Lin
uses 'relational level' synonymously with 'individual level,' and Brass also adds 'individual' to
this term], all scholars remain committed to the view that it is the interacting members who
make the maintenance and reproduction of this social asset possible' (Lin, Cook & Burt 2001,
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1  Original German: Die Anhänger der minimalistischen Position vertreten die Auffassung, dass soziales Kapital
erstens etwas ist, das den Individuen zugehört und primär eine Beziehung zu potenziellen Helfern darstellt.  Im
Lauf der Zeit wurde der Begriff ausgeweitet bzw. "gedehnt", wie manche Kritiker sagen.  Dies gilt insbesondere
für Putnams Verwendung des Begriffs, die eine Vielzahl anderer Faktoren einschließt, um politische und
wirtschaftliche Leistungen auf der Ebene der Gruppe, der Region und der Nation zu erklären.  Ein Beispiel
hierfür ist Fukuyamas Difinition des sozialen Kapitals als "die Normen und Werte, diekoopratives Verhalten
seitens der Gruppen ermöglichen.” Obwohl Coleman als jemand gilt, der Putnams "Dehnung" des Begriffs
ablehnt, hat er in Wirklichkeit eine theoretische Grundlage für die Ausweitung des Begriffs geliefert.
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p. 8)" (Brass 2009, pp. 261-262).
However, this assessment by Brass cannot help but to obfuscate Lin's grounds. The text
by Lin that Brass quotes above, in the context in which Lin himself argues, would be placed in
the process of the debate that points out the problem of unwittingly making the debates about
social capital at the individual level and at the group level coexist, and in that sense, Brass's
excerpt is not appropriate. Brass says that Lin also combines both the individual level and group
level viewpoints, but Lin himself says that a differentiation between the two levels is necessary.
Allow me to explain. As far as handling the social capital concept, it is clear that, as Brass
says, approaches on both the individual level and group level are necessary. As for Lin, he states
that when an individual accesses social capital, he uses interaction as a medium for doing so.
However, the point Lin makes after the text quoted by Brass is that, "However, the divergence
in analyzing social capital at different levels has created some theoretical and measurement
confusion" (Lin 2001b, p. 8), and furthermore, of the two approaches, he points to the problems
arising from the group level point of view. The following excerpt is long, but it is worth looking
at his reasoning. "One major controversy generated from macro- versus relational-level
perspectives [individual] is whether social capital is a collective or an individual good. Most
scholars agree that it is both collective and individual; that is, institutionalized social relations
with embedded resources are expected to benefit both the collective and the individuals in the
collective. At the group level, social capital represents some aggregation of valued resources
(such as economic, political, cultural, or social, as in social connections) of members interacting
as a network or networks. The difficulty arises when social capital is discussed as a collective
or even public good, along with trust, norms, and other "collective" or public goods. What has
resulted in the literature is that the terms have become alternative or substitutable terms
or measurements. Divorced from its roots in individual interactions and networking, social
capital becomes merely another trendy term to employ or deploy in the broad context of
improving or building social integration and solidarity" (ibid., p. 9). In this way, he says, he
attempts to avoid having the collective-good approach and the group level perspective deal with
social capital in forms such as trust, norm, and culture.
As is well known, Nan Lin's definition of social capital was "the resources embedded in
social networks accessed and used by actors for actions" (Lin 2001a, p. 25; JP p. 32). Also,
because the "action" in this case is driven by, more than anything, the desire to exist and the
amassing of resources for that purpose, "Action driven by resource defense is a calculation for
minimizing resource loss (relative loss to cost). Action driven by resource expansion, on the
other hand, is a calculation for maximizing resource gain (relative gain to cost)" (ibid., pp. 130-
131; JP pp. 165-166). That is to say, under the principles of the "minimization of loss" and the
"maximization of gain" of resources, people access social capital by way of interaction, and the
collective rules for this interaction constitute the basis for the social structure. This is where
utilitarian individuals are linked with the social structure. According to Lin, "In general, the
utility of social capital (resources embedded in social ties) substantially exceeds that of personal
or human capital. This calculation, in the face of the scarcity of valued resources, propels the
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extension of interactions beyond one's primordial group. Once such ties and exchanges are
formed, certain collective rules follow. These rules, beyond interacting actors' original intents
and interests, constitute the basis for social structure formation" (ibid., p. 128; JP p. 162). In
this way, an individual forges social relationships through "interactions" in the form of
"exchanges" that go beyond the "ties" in their primordial group.
In terms of methodology, Lin takes a rational individual as his starting point and argues
the path by which that individual, motivated by the maximization of his own utility (as well as
loss minimization), accesses social capital, and he tries to show the connection between the
individual and society. The intermediary means for that is "exchanges." He says the rules for
these exchanges constitute the basis for social structure formation. As far as taking this rational
individual as the starting point, in his logic, this exchange – in the form of an interaction – is
methodologically coherent if we look at it only in terms of an economic exchange in the form
of an exchange of goods. That is because even when an individual whose actions are driven by
utility maximization exchanges goods, or more specifically forges a social relationship, it can
be explained consistently by equating rationality with economic rationality. And yet there may
be some exchanges that are inconsistent with economic rationality. With that in mind, he
distinguishes those from "economic exchanges" governed by economic rationality and proposes
something called "social exchanges."
If there are "social exchanges" that are inconsistent with economic or transactional
rationality, what are they governed by? Is it "trust"? No. According to Lin, "Unless cooperation
also serves an egoistic motivation, the practices of cooperation will be unstable. This means
that a social order based on trust not grounded in self-interest will be unpredictable and unstable;
for this reason, trust is not always functional" (ibid., p. 149; JP p. 190). This observation consists
of citations from several other scholars with regard to social trust, but it is one that is made by
Lin himself as well.
Therefore, he also tries to explain social exchanges that are inconsistent with economic
rationality and transactional rationality through individual interest and rationality. More
specifically, he says that social exchanges are social interactions designed to gain or increase
one's "prestige or reputation" in the form of "the aggregation of episodes of such recognition
accrued to an actor in a social group or community" (ibid., p. 158; JP p. 201). So in his case,
social exchanges that are inconsistent with economic rationality can also be explained by way
of individual interest and rationality, which he calls "relational rationality."
According to Lin, "In transactional rationality, typically implicated in the analysis of
economic exchange, the purpose is to gain economic capital (resources through transactions),
and the interest lies in the transactional aspect of the exchange – the extent to which resources
are transacted, and sometimes mediated, by price and money. The utility of the exchange is to
optimize transactional profit" (ibid., p. 154; JP p. 197). "Relational rationality, on the other hand,
as implicated in social exchange, focuses on the relational aspect of the exchange – the extent
to which a relationship is maintained and promoted, usually mediated by recognition (or the
expectation that the other actor will spread it). The motivation is to gain reputation through
The Senshu Social Capital Review No.2 (2011)
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recognition in networks and groups, and the utility of an exchange is to optimize relational gain
(maintenance of social relationships) – also an analysis of gain and cost" (ibid., pp. 155-156; JP
p. 198).
With a starting point of a rational individual striving for utility maximization, Lin tries to
explain that person's social relationships as well with the notion that rationality is the same as
economic rationality and social rationality, and he does his best to exclude such things as trust
and norms in the form of relational intermediaries between the individual and society. In that
sense, with regard to his social capital theory, Mitsunori Ishida's characterization of Lin's method
as an individual-good approach, introduced at the beginning, is right on the mark. Also, this
individual is someone who tries to maximize his own utility on both fronts – economic (wealth)
and social (prestige, reputation) right down the line. In that sense, Nan Lin's social capital theory
is self-consistent.
But is there not a difficulty that arises in his logic with regard to the formation of social
norms? While excluding trust, he placed rules that were consistent with economic rationality at
the basis of social norms. However, beyond that, he avoided talking about norms. But if social
norms are inconsistent with economic rationality, it is possible to criticize those norms from the
standpoint of economic rationality. On the other hand, if we start from social rationality, which
differs from economic rationality, can we explain any social norms? No, we cannot. This, too,
is because individual utility, namely the "prestige and reputation" that inevitably drives
interaction, cannot exist without the prerequisite of some social norms. He himself says, "Social
credits, recognition, and reputation are all relationally and structurally based utilities. Without
persistent social relations, these profits vanish" (ibid., p. 153; JP p. 195). So, unable to elicit any
social norm formation from the individuals who interact to gain prestige, all he does is to assume
certain social relations. Moreover, he doesn't even ask what those social norms are like or what
society itself is like.
What I question is the following. If social rules and, by extension, norms are formed from
economic rationality, it is possible to criticize a society that is inconsistent with economic
rationality. However, social rationality is something that assumes social relations of some kind
or another, and not something that judges or criticizes the rationality or lack thereof of those
social relations. Yet Lin himself had no intention to inquire about that, and furthermore, while
ruling out any discussion of the formation of those social norms, he discusses social capital's
relationship with an individual striving for utility maximization. In that sense, his method is
consistent. In contrast to this is Putnam. The reason for that is that Lin consciously distances
himself from Putnam's argument in his discussion. However, the social capital theory that argues
the formation of social norms on the axis of a collective-good approach is an extremely strong
current, and in the following section we review the German debate, which exemplifies that
current.
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2. Collective-good approach to social capital
In December 1999, a little over a year after the German Social Democratic Party took the reins
of government in a coalition with the Green party, the German Parliament (the Bundestag)
established under itself a study commission (Enquete Commission) on "The Future of Civic
Engagement." This commission submitted a report to the Bundestag in the spring of 2002 as
well as publishing 11 volumes of a "Library" between 2002 and 2003 that included reports and
the results of studies conducted up until then. The reports make policy recommendations for
promoting the revitalization of civil society through voluntary citizen participation. With regard
to civil society, based on the cumulative studies briskly carried out in Germany beginning in
the mid-1980s, they take Jurgen Kocka's civil society theory (Kocka 2002) in particular as a
prerequisite. I have already spoken in detail on this point in the first volume of the "The Senshu
Social Capital Review" (Murakami 2010).
In this commission report, citizen participation in a civil society is expressed as social
capital. It says, "Civic participation means diversity. And it is only within a broad understanding
that includes all of this diverse activity that all the dimensions of these activities and their
significance for our community become clear. In all the fields of social life, citizens renew our
society's cohesive strength day in and day out through their own voluntary participation. Citizens
create solidarity, belonging, and an environment of mutual trust. In short, citizens maintain and
increase what we now refer to as social capital. More specifically, that refers to the bond between
members of a society, their understanding, the rules, norms, and dependability of values that
they share, as well as their trust of national institutions"2 (Bürsch 2002, p. 8.). Here, social capital
is argued to mean "solidarity, belonging, and an environment of mutual trust." From this point,
social capital research in Germany became brisk in the first decade of the 21st century.
In its efforts aimed at revitalizing citizen participation and civil society, then, based on an
understanding of social capital as being synonymous with solidarity, belonging, and mutual
trust, the study commission naturally took not an individual-good approach but rather a
collective-good approach. In fact, with the objective of drawing on the preceding research in
the US, the commission called upon Elinor Ostrom and Toh-Kyeong Ahn and published their
"Soziales Kapital und kollektives Handeln: Eine sozialwissenschaftliche Perspektive auf soziales
Kapital" (A Social Science Perspective on Social Capital: Social Capital and Collective Action)
in the second volume of their "Library." In addition, on April 2, 2001, they invited Robert
Putnam to speak at a "Citizen Participation and Social Capital" symposium sponsored by the
The Senshu Social Capital Review No.2 (2011)
2  Original German: Bürgerschaftliches Engagement bedeutet Vielfalt, und erst in diesem weiten Verständnis,
das all diese vielfältigen Tätigkeiten einbezieht, erschließen sich die Dimensionen dieser Aktivitäten und ihre
Bedeutung für unser Gemeinwesen.  Die Bürgerinnen und Bürger erneuern mit ihrem freiwilligen Engagement
in allen Bereichen des gesellschaftlichen Lebens Tag für Tag die Bindekräfte unserer Gesellschaft.  Sie schaffen
eine Atmosphäre der Solidarität, der Zugehörigkeit und des gegenseitigen Vertrauens.  Kurz, sie erhalten und
mehren, was wir heute "soziales Kapital" nennen : die Verbundenheit und das Verständnis zwischen den
Mitgliedern einer Gesellschaft, die Verlässlichkeit gemeinsam geteilter Regeln, Normen und Werte und nicht
zuletzt das Vertrauen in die Institutionen des Staates.
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"Citizen Participation and Civil Society" working group within the commission, and he gave a
report there entitled "Sozial Kapital in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in den USA" (Social
Capital in Germany and the USA) (Putnam 2002). The commission's viewpoint of social capital
is clear from the fact that it made efforts to learn from collective-good approach proponents
Putnam and Ostrom. German social scholar Claus Offe also presented a report at the symposium,
entitled "Reproduktionsbedingungen des Sozialvermögens" (Conditions for Recycling Social
Assets) (Offe 2002).
In line with the content of his "Bowling Alone," which had just been published, Putnam
used measurements in this speech such as membership in various groups, frequency of
participation in group events, number of picnics attended, and frequency of hosting home parties,
and said that in the United States, "in the last 25 to 30 years, there has been a considerable
retrogression in all forms of social bonds (Verbundenheit)"3 (Putnam 2002, p. 267); in short, he
argued the retrogression of social capital in the US, and in doing so he issued a warning for the
future of German society.
Also, Ostrom (and Ahn) provided a treatise for the "Library" that could be considered an
overview of social capital, in which they discuss in detail the formation of social norms in
particular. If we explore their logic in contrast to the individual-good approach of Nan Lin
discussed in the previous section, it looks as follows.
They divide the approaches toward social capital into two categories. The first is the
method of "minimal understanding of social capital," in which they say social capital is
something understood as "an individual's gateway into useful personal networks"4 (Ostrom &
Ahn 2003, p. 39). The second is an expansionist understanding, in which "Social capital is
primarily manifested in the form of partially divided norms, shared knowledge, and the rules
that are ordinarily implemented, and it is emphasized as a means of resolving the various
problems with collective action that are encountered by users of relatively local shared
resources"5 (ibid., p. 42). And of these two approaches, Ostrom positions herself and Putnam as
representatives who take an expansionist understanding, or, in short, a collective-good approach.
This is certainly the case, and Ostrom and Ahn mention three different forms as the essence of
social capital – specifically, "norms of trust and reciprocity, networking and citizen participation,
and formal and informal rules and institutions"6 (ibid., p. 55, Ostrom & Ahn 2008, p. 73).
Of these three forms, the ones that Nan Lin painstakingly avoided incorporating into his
own social capital theory was "norms of trust and reciprocity" in particular. Ostrom and Ahn,
3  Original German: ein erheblicher Rückgang aller Formen der sozialen Verbundenheit in den letzten 25 oder
30 Jahren
4  Original German: soziales Kapital als der Zugang von einzelnen zu vorteilhaften persönlichen Netzwerken
5  Original German: Sozial Kapital kommt .... hauptsächlich in der Form geteilter Normen, gemeinsamen
Wissens und gebräuchlicher Regeln vo und wird als Mittel zur Lösung von Problemen kollektiven Handelns
hervorgehoben, dit denen die Nutznießer von relativ lokalen gemeinsamen ressourcen konfrontiert sind.
6  Original German: Vertrauen und Reziprozitätsnormen, Netzwerke/bürgerschaftliches Engagement, formelle
und informelle Regeln oder Institutionen
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on the other hand, make a point of incorporating that as social capital. "Trust" is important for
the formation of social solidarity. That is because "Trust as a form of social capital is the most
important factor when promoting voluntary cooperation. Other forms of social capital nearly
always contribute to the success of collective action by strengthening trust between actors"7
(Ostrom & Ahn 2003. p. 56). Or perhaps it is because "Information on whether or not the other
party is worthy of trust is an important input to help an individual inclined toward reciprocity
determine whether or not to cooperate"8 (ibid., p. 61).
Ostrom and Ahn explain this "trust" formation by likening it to the exchange of goods, in
particular a credit transaction. Specifically, they say, "Let's imagine a transaction in which before
Actor B provides the desired goods, Actor A must pay for them. When A pays and B provides
the goods, both actors are in a better condition than when this transaction does not take place.
However, it is possible that even though A has already paid the price, B does not provide the
goods. This lack of trust will likely lead to a material loss for Actor A. If A does not trust B from
the beginning and refuses the transaction, B loses the chance to sell his products and, in doing
so, to increase his own happiness. Trusting and being worthy of trust are therefore of decisive
importance for the conclusion of many complex transactions in modern life"9 (ibid., pp. 57-58).
Also, when another pair of actors are added to these two, the relationship expands. That is,
"Even if transactions between A and B are not repeated that frequently, let's assume there is also
a C and a D. C and D obtain information about those transactions and decide whether or not to
carry out a transaction themselves with A in the future according to whether or not A behaved
in a trustworthy manner in their transaction with B. Therefore, A receives an incentive to not
cheat B again. In that case, he does so not because of the prospect of future profit from another
transaction with B, but rather because of the expectation of profit from transactions with C and
D"10 (ibid., p. 59).
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7  Original German: Vertrauen als eine Form sozialen Kapitals ist der wichtigste Faktor bei der Förderung
freiwilliger Kooperation.  Die anderen Formen sozialen Kapitals tragen zu erfolgreichem kollektiven Handeln
fast immer dadurch bei, dass sie das Vertrauen zwischen den Handelnden stärken.
8  Original German: Informationen über die Vertrauenswürdigkeit der Anderen sind ein wichtiger Input für die
Entscheidung eines an Reziprozität orientierten Individuums, ob es kooperieren soll oder nicht.
9  Original German: Zu denken wäre an eine Geschäftstransaktion, bei der Akteur A bezahlen muss, bevor
Akteur B das gewünschte Gut liefert.  Wenn A den Preis bezahlt und B das Gut liefert, stehen beide besser
da, als wenn die Transaktion nicht stattgefunden hätte.  B könnte jedoch versucht sein, das Gut nicht zu
liefern, obwohl A den Preis schon bezahlt hat.  Dieser Mangel an Vertrauenswürdigkeit würde für Akteur A
zu einem Nettoverlust führen.  Wenn A B nicht von Anfang an vertraut und sich weigert, die Transaktion
abzuschließen, hat B eine Gelegenheit verloren, sein Produkt zu verkaufen und damit seinen Wohlstand zu
vermehren.  Daher sind Vertrauen und Vertrauenswürdigkeit entscheidend für den Abschluß vieler komplexer
Transaktion im modernen Leben.
10 Original German: Nehmen wir an, dass, obwohl die Transaktion zwischen A und B sich nicht oft wiederholt,
es andere Akteure C und D gibt, die Informationen über diese Transaktion erhalten und ihre zukünftigen
Transaktionen mit A davon abhängig machen, ob A sich in seiner Transaktion mit B vertrauenswürdig verhält.
Dann hat wiederum A einen Anreiz, B nicht zu betrügen, und zwar nicht wegen der Aussicht auf einen
zukünftigen Nutzen durch Transaktion mit B, sondern wegen der Erwartung von Vorteilen in Transaktion mit
C und D.
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In this case, it goes without saying that the actors in the transaction established here are
selfish individuals. "It is possible that even an extremely selfish individual would not cheat
someone who trusts them under these circumstances. In fact, a selfish individual who is
embedded in unfailingly repeated interaction is likely to respond to trust. And he does so because
he is selfish, quite simply, and because he expects profits from future transactions with someone
who trusts him"11 (ibid., pp. 58-59).
Furthermore, Ostrom and Ahn point out that the decision of whether to trust under
circumstances in which "there is no information on whether or not another person is trustworthy
nor about the structure of their motivation"12 (ibid., p. 60) is based on the observable
characteristics of the relevant party, such as their appearance, clothing, gender, age, and
language. But they go no further than simply pointing this out.
So they argue that trust is essential for the realization of credit transactions and other
transactions in the venue of an exchange of goods, and that trust is expanded through the
repetition of such transactions as well as through observations of the other party, although the
actors in this case were "selfish individuals." In this case, we can explain the exchange of
products carried out by selfish individuals who sympathize with each other's self-interest as in
Adam Smith's "Theory of Moral Sentiments." And furthermore, aren't we reminded of the logic
by which the same principle enables social formation? Smith says, "Where the necessary
assistance is reciprocally afforded from love, from gratitude, from friendship, and esteem, the
society flourishes and is happy. ... But though the necessary assistance should not be afforded
from such generous and disinterested motives, though among the different members of the
society there should be no mutual love and affection, the society, though less happy and
agreeable, will not necessarily be dissolved. Society may subsist among different men, as among
different merchants, from a sense of its utility, without any mutual love or affection; and though
no man in it should owe any obligation, or be bound in gratitude to any other, it may still be
upheld by a mercenary exchange of good offices according to an agreed valuation" (Smith 1759,
pp. 85-86; JP (Vol. 1) pp. 222-223). Smith tells exactly the same thing when he explains the
principle for the establishment of the division of labor at the beginning of "An Inquiry into the
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations." According to Smith, "But man has almost constant
occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence
only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favor, and shew
them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them" (Smith 1776, p.
11 Original German: Es kann sein, dass selbst sehr eigennützige Individuen die Vertrauen schenkende Person
unter diesen Umständen nicht betrügen.  Tatsächlich wird ein eigennütziges Individium, das in gesicherte
wiederholte Interaktionen eingebettet ist, das Vertrauen erwidern, und zwar genau deshalb, weil es eigennützi
ist und sich von zukünftigen Transaktionen mit der Vertrauen schenkenden Person Vorteile erhofft.
12 Original German: Da es weder Informationen über die Vertrauenswürdigkeit noch über die Anrezstruktur
der anderen Person gibt
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26; JP (Vol. 1) p. 38). And that is how an exchange relationship is formed when someone needs
the cooperation and assistance of another person. Smith's "Theory of Moral Sentiments" further
explained the formation of "due consideration" in every individual's social actions by the
self-internalization of these sentiments.
The method of trying to explain social reciprocity with selfish individuals, and moreover
by an occasion where those individuals exchange products, even if it is not original to Ostrom
and Ahn (Smith!), can be considered as appropriate and fundamental for discussing the formation
of civil society and social capital. Nan Lin placed a utilitarian individual at the starting point
for social capital and discussed the relationships through which this selfish individual accessed
social capital. When trying to preserve the coherence of this method, he painstakingly avoided
incorporating trust and social norms as factors in social capital. However, Ostrom and Ahn show
that it is possible to explain things like trust and social norms even with a selfish individual as
the basis. There is a need to discuss social interaction without first and foremost going out of
one's way to bring up love, friendship, and respect. That is because civil society should consist
of the reciprocity and solidarity that, as relations between people expand, causes people who
are basically strangers to be unavoidably woven in.
3. The Logic of Norm Formation in Civil Society
After the publication of the "Library" by the German Parliament's study commission on "The
Future of Civic Engagement," numerous studies of social capital came out in Germany. I
introduced, as one example, "Civil Society and Social Capital" (Klein/Kern/Geissel/Berger
2004), which strongly reflects the tenor of "Library," in the first volume of this collection of
essays, the "The Senshu Social Capital Review (Murakami 2010)." The essays compiled in the
collection do not treat civil society as simply a model but as something that relies on a political
and social context. And at the same time, emphasis is placed on pointing out that social capital,
too, does not necessarily have a happy cause and effect association with democracy as purported
in Putnam's hypothesis. Moreover, the essays were an attempt to criticize politics and institutions
that produce negative civil societies and social capital. This book does not deny the positive
elements of civil society and social capital, though, but rather takes the position of alleging that
negative elements do presently exist (Murakami 2009, Klein/Kern/Geissel/Berger 2004). In the
context of this paper's argument, this book also leans toward a collective-good approach of
social capital.
The book's editor summarized the main thrust of the book as follows. He wrote, "First,
the formation of a 'good civil society' and 'positive' social capital comes about in a variety of
contexts and forms. Second, automatic links between participation in civil society networks and
associations and, on the other hand, social and political integration does not exist. Third, the
promotion of the associations that can create bridges between groups, in particular, can
be considered meaningful for social and political integration. That is because only in that way
is it possible for the positive effects of social capital (mutual support, cooperative action, trust
formation, institutional effects) to be maximized, and the negative effects (formation of factions
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and sects, ethnocentrism, corruption) to be minimized"13 (Klein/Kern/Geissel/Berger 2004,
p.13). Even these authors, who criticize a rose-colored model of civil society and social capital,
do not deny the value of its positive effects. Its value in that case is likely to eventually be further
realization of social integration and democracy. Even for them, democratic social integration is
a "value," hence it is clear that their approach to social capital is also a collective-good approach.
In the wake of Ostrom and Ahn's argument, a book appeared that deals with norms,
particularly trust formation, as its main subject. That was Sandra Seubert's "Das Konzept des
Sozialkapitals, Eine demokratietheoretische Analyse" (Theoretical Analysis of Democracy and
the Concept of Social Capital) (Seubert 2009). What interests her regarding social capital in the
context of civil society theory is, first of all, "the problem of reacquisition or improvement of
the state's capacity for action.... [Here,] a new form of control is sought, one that includes a
decentralized action system of non-state-based actors and networks. In association with this, a
bridge is built to the social capital concept as the source of the autonomous collaboration and
self-organization that is envisioned in a civil society"14 (Seubert 2009, p. 11). Secondly,
"Although it is a debate in which social integration and social bonding pose a problem, here the
social capital concept becomes a theme that covers the exploration of potential for the solidarity
of modern society and the organization of the welfare state. ...  Insofar as the danger to the
welfare state can currently be interpreted as the danger of the legal and bureaucratic
modification, or Umsetzung, of solidarity – that is to say, caring for people as if they were clients
instead of out of a specific readiness of the mind and responsibility, etc. to provide assistance –
the theory of social capital is well-suited for taking into account civil society's contribution to
social welfare"15 (ibid., p. 12).
13 Original German: Aus den Resultaten lässt sich erstens ableiten, dass die Bildung von "guter
Zivilgesellschaft" und "positivem" Sozialkapital in unterschiedlichen Kontexten auf verschiedene Weise erfolgt.
Zweitens lässt sich folgern, dass es keinen automatischen Zusammenhang zwischen dem Engagement in
zivilgesellschaftlichen Netzwerken und Assoziationen auf der einen und sozialer wie politischer Integration auf
der anderen Seite gibt.  Drittens scheint für die soziale und politische Integration vor allem die Förderung jener
Assoziationen sinnvoll zu sein, durch die Brücken zwischen Gruppen aufgebaut werden, denn nur so können
die positiven Auswirkungen von Sozialkapital (gegenseitige Unterstützung, kooperatives Handeln,
Vertrauensbildung, institutionelle Effektivität) mazimiert und gleichzeitig die negativen Effekte (Bildung von
Cliquen und Sekten, Ethnozentrismus, Korruption) minimiert werden.
14 Original German: Ausgangspunkt in dem ersten Diskurs ist das Problem der Wiedergewinnung bzw.
Verbesserung staatlicher Handlungsfähigkeit.  Gesucht werden neue formen der Steuerung, die nicht allein auf
hierarchische anweisungs- und Kontrollstrukturen setzen, sondern auch eine Beteiligung nicht-staatlicher
Akteure in dezentralen Verhandlungssystemen und Netzwerken vorsehen.  In diesem Zusammenhang wird eine
Brücke zum Sozialkapital-Begriff als Quelle freiwillger Kooperation und Selbstorganisation, die in der
Bürgergesellschaft vermutet wird, geschlagen.
15 Original German: In dem Zweiten Diskurs, in dem es um soziale Integration und gesellschaftlichen
Zusammenhalt geht, wird das Konzept des Sozialkapitals mit Blick auf dei suche nach Solidaritätspotentialen
moderner Gesellschaften und die Organisation von Wohlfahrsstaatlichkeit thematisiert.･･･Insofern die Krise
des Wohlfahrtsstaats nun als Krise der rechtlich-bürokratischen Umsetzung von Solidarität interpretiert wird,
die eine klientelistische Versorgung an die Stelle konkreter Hilfsbereitschaft und Verantwortung setzt, bietet
sich die Theorie des Sozialkapitals an, um bürgergesellschaftliche Beiträge zur sozialen Wohlfahrt in anschlag
zu bringen.
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In other words, the clarification of social capital is said to have as its objective the
reacquisition or improvement of the state's capacity for action through the revitalization of civil
society, or an attempt to find the potential for using social solidarity to prevent the welfare state
from becoming a mere shell. This means, therefore, that Seubert effectively takes a
collective-good approach as well. But according to her, the very act of making an analogy in
which social capital is the same as physical capital and human capital, or equating "capital"
with goods, is a problem. For her, without the initiative of an actor in relation to these "goods,"
social capital cannot help but to be external to that actor, and that situation does not lead to the
revitalization of civil society. Therefore, the actor's initiative and the formation of norms that
underpin that initiative become very important for her. Below, I will present her logic on that
point which she presents in response to Putnam.
Seubert narrows down the core of Putnam's social capital concept, which she calls too
broad and vague, to "goods [Vermögen] for collective action by way of social networking"16
(ibid., p. 90). This 'Vermögen,' borrowed from Claus Offe (Offe 2002, p. 273), means not only
goods but also potential. Specifically, social capital is still potential, and it is activated only by
actors who are related to it. And as for the norms of reciprocity that are shared by these actors,
she says the principles for their formation are not yet understood. Only once this is explained is
it possible for "the social capital concept to concord with the republican basis of civil society
that places at its core the distinctive value of public freedom and inclusive citizens"17 (Seubert
2009, p. 91). She says the problem lies in trying to discuss social capital as a concept in which
the value of social interaction is not taken into account in the first place and is considered
analogous to "capital," or in other words, in an economic framework. Specifically, she says,
"The traditional model of collective action, as I have sketched, is based on the action
understanding and rational understanding originating from individual people's calculations of
utility. In response to this, social capital is also being conceptualized using the logic of
investment and profits. However, this approach comes up against the question of whether
rationality, a concept borrowed from economics, can capture the distinctive logic of society or
not, and whether we can appropriately judge the meaning of social moral resources for the sake
of democracy”18 (ibid., p. 93).
Meanwhile, according to Seubert, Ostrom effectively goes beyond the rational preference
frame of mind inasmuch as she "discusses how numerous the contrary examples are featuring
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16 Original German: durch soziale Vernetzung geschaffenes Vermögen zu kollektivem Handeln
17 Original German: Könnte ein solches Begriffsverständnis prinzipiell unvereinbar sein mit einer
republikanischen Grundlegung der Bürgerschaft in den Mittelpunkt stellt?
18 Original German: Das traditionelle Modell kollektiven Handelns legt, wie skizziert, ein Handlungs- und
Rationalitätsverständnis zugrunde, das von individuellen Nuzenkalkülen ausgeht.  Dementsprechend wird auch
Sozialkapial nach der Logik von Investition und Ertrag konzipiert.  Diese Ansätze sehen sich allerdings mit der
Frage konfrontiert, ob ein dem Ökonomischen entlehnter Begriff der Rationalität, die Eigenlogik des Sozialen
erfassen und di Bedeutung soziomoralischer Ressourcen für die Demokratie angemessen einschätzen kann.
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irrational cooperation due to a one-dimensional concept of rationality"19 (ibid., p. 95). Certainly
Ostrom did say that at the heart of conventional collective action theory "there is an image of
an individual who is autonomous and selfish, and who acts completely rationally. In reality,
people do not live in one self-sustaining world"20 (Ostrom & Ahn 2003, p. 55), and that in reality,
there are some unselfish individuals who are part of a group and consider the interests of other
people. However, because they consider other people's interests, Ostrom presents the
"expectations" of people involved in an exchange of goods as the origin of individuals' trust and
reciprocity, a fact that is just as we saw in the last section. Also, Ostrom mentions circumstances
such as observing the other party's characteristics, such as their appearance, clothing, gender,
age, and language, as another example of granting trust to that party, but all she does is point it
out.
Seubert tries to go beyond this "rational preference approach," or the economic frame of
thought. The premise for that is the theory of communicative action (Habermas!), she says. As
Ostrom says, "It causes trust to grow inside an actor, in the form of expectations regarding the
future behavior of other actors. This affects the decision to trust them again. In this way, a
positively strengthened cycle is created"21 (Seubert 2009, p. 96). She says that when this
happens, it is due to communicative interaction. That is to say, "First, when people see each
other or speak with each other, they can better judge whether the other party is worthy of trust.
Communication clearly guarantees the social existence of norms (expanded validity). In the
absence of communication, no one's reputation is threatened. That is because no one is firmly
and consciously bound to their own word. Second, what does an agreement expressed in words
rely on, but the power of an individual promise? The expression of an individual promise turns
the reneging of that promise into a question of individual identity. If someone does not keep
their word, he is no longer the person he declared himself to be beforehand. In that case, not
only the verbal expression itself but things like the way he talks and the expression on his face,
for example, play a role. (Thus face to face interaction cannot easily be replaced by computer
communication)"22 (ibid., p. 96).
19 Original German: Es gebe.....zu viele Gegenbeispiele der Kooperation, die nach eindimensionalen
Rationalitäsbegriff irrational seien.
20 Original German: Im Zentrum der Theorien der ersten Generation steht das Bild atomisierter, eigennütziger
und völlig rational handelnder Individuen.  In Wirklichkeit leben Menschen nicht in einer atomisierten Welt.
21 Original German: Das lässt Vertrauen als Erwartung über das zukünftige Verhalten anderer unter den
Akteuren wachsen, was wiederum die Entscheidung zu vertrauen beeinflusst.  So entsteht ein sich positiv
verstärkender Kreislauf.
22 Original German: Zum einen kann man Vertrauenswürdigkeit besser abschätzen, wenn man sich sieht und
spricht.  Kommunikation führt aber offensichtlich auch dazu, die soziale Existenz .... von Normen
sicherzustellen. ......Ohne Kommunikation ist niemandes Ruf gefährdet, weil niemand sich bewusst festgelegt
hat.  Worauf eine verbal geäußerte Übereinstimmung also baut, ist zweitens die Kraft persönlicher Versprechen.
Durch das Äußern des persönlichen Versprechens wird das Halten des Versprechens zu einer Frage der
persönlichen Identität.  Wenn man sein Wort nicht hält, ist man nicht mehr diejenige, als die man sich vorher
präsentiert hat.  Dabei spielt nicht nur die sprachliche Äußerung an sich, sondern auch die Art des Sprechens,
der Gesichtsausdruck etc. eine Rolle (weshalb Face-to-face-Interaktion sich auch nicht ohne weiteres durch
Computer-Kommunikation ersetzen lässt).
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The principle of the formation of reciprocity as a norm is the same logic. "What reciprocity
means is, namely, it can be seen as a conditional norm along the lines of 'If X does A, Y must
do B.' ... In this exchange relationship, there exists an expectation of mutuality, that is to say an
expectation that an action in the form of assistance or things will probably be 'paid back' in the
future, or that this will be repeated"23 (ibid., p. 105). However, "If we see reciprocity as not
merely a social norm but rather a moral norm, it is not the value of the things that are exchanged
that plays the primary role but rather people's approval that plays the primary role. In reciprocity,
the individual goes beyond the quid pro quo logic of 'give because it was given to me' and seeks
fundamental approval as a morally equivalent actor"24 (ibid., p. 107). She says it is not through
economic exchange but precisely through this kind of reciprocity by communicative action that
mutual recognition as an equal actor can come about, and this, as a result, finally makes it
possible to argue the "horizontal interaction as equals" in an association that Putnam also
mentions. She must have thought that this is what substantiates an actor's own principle for
forming a norm of reciprocity, and the initiative for interaction that arises from that.
This logic of social norm formation that Seubert holds, as is already clear, is put forth as
essentially a theoretical prerequisite for Jurgen Habermas's communicative action theory.
Habermas, in his 1968 "Knowledge and Human Interests," defined knowledge gained by
people's actions relating to a subject in the labor process as "instrumental knowledge," and he
searched for something different than knowledge and action exclusive to the processing and
control of the subject at hand, or instrumental knowledge and instrumental action. And that
turned out to be communicative action (1981, "Theory of Communicative Action"). The
evolution of "instrumental knowledge" in the form of technically processed knowledge brings
about "the colonization of one's life world" by marketing and bureaucracy. If this is true, in
order to go beyond that, we must separate the venue of knowledge formation from the economic
process (labor process). That is his motivation for perceiving communicative action as the venue
for knowledge formation. Habermas's logic is that people's social relationships emerge from
this and form a venue for critical debate that is relatively independent from the economic process
and political process – in other words, a civil society. 
However, if civil society is formed this way in a position of isolation from the economic
process, then what sort of knowledge is it, after all, that is formed through communication?
Won't the critical knowledge that is formed by civil society end up being merely the acquisition
of "self-awareness"? Actually, I believe the current civil society theory that has been expounded
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23 Original German: Reziprozität ist so gesehen eine bedingte Norm, die im Wesentlichen besagt, "if X does
A, Y should do B". ..... Generalisierte....Reziprozität beschreibt dabei eine anhaltende Beziehung des Austauschs,
in der die wechselseitige Erwartung besteht, dass eine Leistung in Form von Hilfe oder Gütern in Zukunft
"zurückgezahlt", also erwidert wird.
24 Original German: Betrachtet man Reziprozität nicht bloß als soziale, sondern als moralische Norm, so spielt
nicht der Wert des Getauschten die primäre Rolle, sondern die Anerkennung der Person.  Über eine do ut des-
Logik hinausgehend, verlangt sie nämlich eine grundsätzliche Anerkennung als moralisch gleichberechtigte
Akteure.
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under the influence of Habermas falls, as a whole, into the framework of solidarity brought
about by the self-awareness of citizens (Murakami 2011).
If we think of it this way, Seubert's social norms (norms of trust and reciprocity), which
are premised on Habermas's theory of communicative action, look like they too could end up
being just a naive "self-awareness" theory, if we look only at the logical composition described
above. She probably thought she surpassed not only Putnam but also Ostrom in terms of
creativity. In fact, Ostrom tried to explain the formation of trust based on an "exchange of goods"
relationship, and even though she did earmark the other party's "behavior" as a deciding factor
in trust formation, she did nothing more than to point it out, only expressing it as "merely a
clue," according to Seubert. Seubert probably thinks that she pushed that idea further along by
identifying communicative action as the principle for forming trust, reciprocity, and the
"initiative" behind them, without resorting to an economic analogy. However, in order for the
civil society theory not to end up as merely a self-awareness theory, it may actually be better
not to go beyond the scope of Ostrom's logic, in which she tries to discuss norm formation
between the members of a civil society in the venue of an exchange of goods.
Civil society is not reciprocal relations between members in what is an intimate sphere to
begin with, but rather reciprocal relations with strangers in which people exchange things outside
of an intimate sphere, and it has the expansion of exchanges (division of labor) as an unavoidable
condition. Therefore, we can say that Ostrom, in trying to explain the norms of trust and
reciprocity between members, stays just barely within the framework of a civil society in this
sense.
This paper has compared Nan Lin, Elinor Ostrom (and Ahn) and Sandra Seubert and examined
their approaches to social capital and, by extension, the concept of social capital itself.
Taking rational individualism as his starting point, Nan Lin attempted to clarify how social
relationships could be conceptualized as capital because of how an individual seeking to
maximize his utility accesses social relationships and how he is able to elicit benefits from those
relationships. His method takes the standpoint of a rational individual and is consistent about
not digressing from it. He thus purposefully did not touch upon what social capital or the social
structure itself should be like, or the underlying social norms. Yet if that is the case, the issue of
what social norms and social structure should be like does not pose a problem, since the criteria
for social capital is whether or not it is beneficial for individuals. To the extent that it benefits
the individual, social capital is a social structure based on communal relationships such as shared
territorial bonds and blood relations, or the modern civil society structure shaped by the demise
of communal relationships, and Lin would not likely question the difference between them. 
Meanwhile, Ostrom (with Ahn), in contrast to Nan Lin, takes a collective-good approach
and inquires about the formation of social norms and the characteristics of social structures and
institutions that are organized by those norms or influence the formation of those norms.
However, she basically holds fast to the standpoint of rational individualism and explains the
formation of norms of trust and reciprocity based on the exchange of goods (credit transactions).
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In contrast to this, Seubert's position is even clearer than Ostrom's in that she inquires
about social norm formation as well as about what social structure and institutions should be
like (envisioning, in this case, democratic values). Furthermore, both Ostrom and Seubert
explore how the underlying norms of trust and reciprocity are formed. But Seubert points out
the limits of social theory based on utilitarian rationality and divorces the explanatory principles
of the formation of norms of trust and reciprocity from the economic process represented by
the exchange of goods. More specifically, communicative action serves as the venue for the
formation of norms of trust and reciprocity. According to Seubert, who relies on Habermas's
framing of the issues, it is only in this venue that an actor's initiative with regard to norms is
created and the democratic revitalization of civil society becomes possible.
What is characteristic of Habermas, and thus also characteristic of Seubert, is a method
that uses communicative action as an explanatory principle for human relations. Let's recall
Seubert's words that were quoted earlier in this paper. "... [What] does an agreement expressed
in words rely on, but the power of an individual promise? The expression of an individual
promise turns the reneging of that promise into a question of individual identity. If someone
does not keep their word, he is no longer the person he declared himself to be beforehand"25
(p. 96). Therefore, she says that mutual agreement to a promise between two individuals relies
on the self-obligation of the parties who submitted the promise. To rephrase this in simple terms,
she is basically saying, "If one does not keep one's promise, one betrays oneself." Arguing the
formation of trust by communicative action using this explanation is too naive. Seubert probably
sees herself as having surpassed Ostrom. Although I agree with Ostrom's perception of the issues
across the board, there is something I would like to say to Seubert. That is: It’d be more valuable
not to go beyond Ostrom.
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